Guest post by Kaidi (KD) Zhang, Stanford Law School J.D. expected 2027; UC Berkeley Ph.D. in Chemistry 2024
The Supreme Court will hear arguments in Hikma v. Amarin on April 29. The core question before the Court is seemingly straightforward but carries massive industry implications: Should a patent infringement claim based on inducement survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss if the alleged infringer uses a statutorily permitted “skinny label,” but markets its generic drug as the “therapeutically equivalent” of the patented drug?
In the decision below, the Federal Circuit held that pleading “the totality of the allegations of inducement” as “a whole” was sufficient for an induced infringement case to proceed. This ruling continued to narrow the viability of skinny labels, following the court’s earlier decision in GlaxoSmithKline LLC v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. (GSK), where it upheld a jury verdict of induced infringement based on a skinny label.
In a recent Stanford Law Review article, Professors Jacob Sherkow and Paul Gugliuzza criticized the GSK decision for “turn[ing] two decades of Federal Circuit jurisprudence on drug labels and inducement on its head.” The Supreme Court declined to intervene then, but has granted certiorari in this case, which may have profound implications for the pharmaceutical industry. A brand-name drug is often approved to treat multiple different conditions (known as “indications”). Over time, the patent for the original drug compound may expire, but the brand-name company might still hold active “method-of-use” patents for specific indications. In many cases, companies pursue these additional indications after the drug is already on the market, which can extend their exclusivity.
Section viii (21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(viii)) of the Hatch-Waxman Act provides a statutory pathway for generic companies to enter the market before all method-of-use patents have expired. It allows a generic manufacturer to submit a statement to the FDA essentially saying: “We only want approval to sell this drug for older, unpatented uses; we are not seeking approval for the use that is still under patent.” To legally utilize the Section viii pathway, the generic manufacturer must remove—or “carve out”—all instructions, marketing, and references related to the patented use from their product’s packaging and informational inserts.
This specific dispute centers on Vascepa, a brand-name drug developed by the respondent, Amarin. Vascepa was initially approved in 2012 for a small group of patients suffering from severe hypertriglyceridemia (SH). In 2019, following a five-year study involving 8,000 patients, the drug received approval for a second indication for reducing the risks of cardiovascular events (CV). The petitioner, Hikma, subsequently developed a generic version of Vascepa (icosapent ethyl) and obtained FDA approval to sell the drug exclusively for the SH indication using the Section viii pathway.
Notably, there are 11 companies with generic versions of icosapent ethyl approved for SH, and many of these generics (seven at the time the respondent’s brief was filed) are already on the market. Even though all generic pharmaceuticals are legally required to have the same labels carving out the CV indication, Amarin only sued Hikma because, according to Amarin, “[Hikma] alone chose to publish statements that healthcare providers would interpret as encouraging prescriptions that infringe respondents’ patents.”
Under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b), inducement liability requires that a party “actively induce[d]” a direct infringer to take specific action that suffices for “infringement of a patent.” Hikma contends it can be liable only if it actively encourages medical professionals to prescribe its generic icosapent ethyl specifically for the CV indication, and that none of its actions rise to this level. It argues that its skinny label encourages only non-infringing use, and that its external statements do not actively induce specific conduct. Hikma emphasizes that the only time the patented CV indication was mentioned on the label was to warn of the drug’s potential side effects “in people who have heart (cardiovascular) disease.” This warning, Hikma argues, cannot plausibly establish active inducement of the CV treatment method. Therefore, the case should be dismissed for failure to state a claim under the rigorous Iqbal-Twombly pleading standard.
